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1 Introduction
Empirically informed normative theories of distributive justice1 usually share
two properties, namely, pluralism and context dependence (Konow and
Schwettmann, 2016). Justice is pluralistic if it consists of multiple fairness
criteria. It is context dependent if the weight that is given to each criterion
depends on ‘impersonal fundamentals’ (institutional factors, culture etc.)
and personal traits (such as age and gender). Apart from the two top dogs
equality and equity, need has been identified as one of the main ingredients of
pluralistic justice theories (Konow, 2001, 2003). However, if distributive jus-
tice depends on several fairness criteria, the present dominance of egalitarian
inequality measurement in applied economics fails at giving a full picture of
perceived injustice of societies.
Surprisingly, as compared to the vast literature on inequality measure-
ment, almost no attention bas been paid to the measurement of need-based
justice so far. The only exemption that bears similarity to our idea is Jasso’s
(1978) theory of justice evaluation (surveyed in Jasso et al. 2016). Accord-
ing to Jasso, the justice evaluation of an income is the logarithm of the ratio
of acutal reward to the just reward. The purpose of the present paper is
to define a concept and to introduce an ethically compelling measurement
of need-based justice. Such a measurement could make a contribution to a
more complete empirically informed picture of distributive justice.
The first authors to experimentally investigate whether in addition to eq-
uity and equality need exists as a third principle of distributive justice were
psychologists Lamm and Schwinger (1980, 1983). In a questionnaire experi-
ment subjects (128 high school students) had to allocate money between two
hypothetical teammates, who had contributed equally to a project but dif-
fered in their needs. The needier person was indeed allocated a significantly
higher share than the less needy person even if the relationship between both
was described as loose or if the needier person was responsible for her higher
need. The inventors of empirical social choice (for a survey see Gaernter
and Schokkaert, 2012), Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) asked their subjects (163
Hebrew University applicants) to divide fruit between Jones and Smith in a
just way. If Jones and Smith differed in their vitamin F needs, 82% of the
1We do not embark here on the debate whether empirical facts can or should contribute
to normative theories of distributive justice et all. This issue and many more interesting
aspects of empirically informed ethics are carefully addressed in an edited volume by
Christen et al. (2014), though unfortunately the perspective of economics is missing.
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subjects chose the fruit allocation that exactly the same amount of vitamin
F. These studies, however, did not consider need in competition with other
fairness principles.
The first authors to experimentally study several competing fairness ide-
als at the same time were Frohlich et al. (1987). Interestingly, they found a
strong prevalence of the ‘Boulding principle’ (Traub et al., 2005), the maxi-
mization of the average payoff subject to a floor constraint in their subjects’
(220 US and Canadian students) choices. Among 44 five-person groups, 35
chose the Boulding principle, while only 7 maximized the average payoff (util-
itarianism) and two groups decided for Rawlsian maximin or maximization
of the average payoff subject to a range constraint. In a study by Traub et
al. (2005) subjects (61 students of the University of Kiel) had to rank in-
come distributions from under a veil of ignorance with (ignorance scenario)
and without (risk scenario) known probabilities. In the ignorance scenario,
the Boulding principle turned out as the top performer among all considered
fairness standards; in the risk scenario it was among the top three next to
average payoff maximization and randomization preferences. These studies
show that need considerations are an important aspect of distributive justice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section,
we introduce a concept of need-based justice. Notation and definitions are
given in Section 3. Axioms for an ethical measurement of need-based justice
are presented in Section 4. We derive two indices of need-based justice in
Section 5. Section 6 gives numerical examples. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Concept of Need-based Justice
Like ethical poverty measurement (pioneered by Sen, 1976), the concept of
need-based justice measurement is twofold. First, needs have to be acknowl-
edged at a societal level. Second, a method is required that aggregates the
need-characteristics of a group of people into an overall image of justice.
Though this article focusses on aggregation, we want to briefly address the
first step, the societal acknowledgement of needs, in the following.
Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation is probably the most influ-
ential approach to needs (for a survey of the psychological literature on needs
see Diederich, 2017). The theory holds that there is a hierarchy of needs with
physiological needs at the bottom, outranked by safety, love/belonging, and
esteem needs, and with self-actualization at the top. The lower the need in
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the hierarchy the stronger it is. Absolute concepts of poverty like the basic
needs approach rely on expert knowledge regarding the minimum cost diet
that secures physical survival of an individual (Seidl, 1988). Studying the
living conditions of the working class in York, Rowntree (1901) for instance
defined “families whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum
necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency” (p. 86) as poor.
Living standards in a society can grow or shrink. Restricting needs to
physical survival would ignore the fact that the satisfaction of both physiolog-
ical and (higher level) psychological needs contributes to mental health and
thus the well-being of people (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
Sociological relative deprivation theories (Runciman, 1966; Townsend, 1974)
carry the subjectivity of needs to the extreme. According to Runciman (1966)
a person is deprived if she does not have something, somebody else has it,
she wants to have it, and she thinks that obtaining it is realistic.
Both the purely absolute and the relative view of need and poverty were
harshly criticized by Sen (1983). He proposed the concept of absolute depri-
vation instead. It is worthwhile to repeat a quote from Adam Smith’s ‘The
Wealth of Nations’ from Sen’s article in order to illustrate the meaning of
absolute deprivation:
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but what ever the
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even the lowest order, to be without. [. . . ] Custom [. . . ] has
rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest
creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in
public without them. (Smith, 1776, 351–352)
Accordingly, a person is absolutely deprived if she does not have the capa-
bility, say, in terms of income in order to partake in the commonly accepted
activities of the community. In other words, neediness means that a person
is ashamed because she is not able to purchase leather shoes and not because
she has less than other people. Hence, in the following we have the capa-
bilities approach (Sen, 2009; Nussbaum, 2000, 2011) in mind when talking
about needs.
Indeed, modern welfare states try to guarantee their citizens social par-
ticipation through their tax and social systems, in particular. For example,
Articles 1, 3 and 20 of Germany’s constitution protect human dignity, grant
equality before the law, and contain the welfare state as a national objective
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(‘Sozialstaatsprinzip’). In its jurisdiction Germany’s constitutional court has
interpreted these articles in terms of a basic right to live above the breadline
and to partake in common social activities. For example, the court imposed
the legislator to exempt the ‘subsistence level’ from income taxation and
to align childrens’ social welfare benefits with ‘actual needs’ using a trans-
parent and appropriate (statistical) method.2 Of course, there is still some
ambiguity left about what actual needs are to be taken into account.
3 Notation and Definitions
We consider a set I of individuals i = {1, . . . , n}, who are endowed with ωi ≥
0 units of a good or service. Every individual needs at least a small amount
ν of the good or service in order to survive or to partake in a commonly
accepted social activity. As in poverty measurement, where the poverty line is
the same for each individual, we assume identical needs. Differences in needs
that result, for example, from household composition and size, can be taken
into account by means of an equivalence scale which adjusts endowments.
Let ~ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) denote an allocation of endowments. Ω =
∑n
i=1 ωi
denotes the total endowment. N = nν denotes the total need.
We split I into two subsets, namely, those individuals whose needs have
been satisfied, ωi ≥ ν, and those who are dissatisfied in their needs, ωi < ν.
The set of the satisfied is denoted by S = {i ∈ I : ωi ≥ ν} and their
number is given by s = #(S). The set of the dissatisfied is denoted by
D = {i ∈ I : ωi < ν} and their number is given by d = #(D). The
individual degree of need satisfaction is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Need Satisfaction) The individual degree of need satisfac-
tion is given by γi = min{ωi/ν, 1} ∀ i ∈ I.
~γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn) is a profile of need satisfaction.
Apart from need satisfaction, we are also interested in need-based alloca-
tion efficiency. First, we define oversupply
Definition 2 (Oversupply) The individual oversupply is given by
`i = max{ωi−ν, 0} ∀ i ∈ I. The aggregate oversupply is given by L =
∑
i∈I `i.
and then introduce our notion of need-based allocation efficiency:
2Judgement of the First Senate of the German Constitutional Court from February
9th, 2010.
5
Definition 3 (Allocation Efficiency) The need-based efficiency of the al-
location ~ω is given by
Γε =
{ (
1− L
Ω
)ε
for D 6= ∅
1 else .
(1)
Γε is an index of need-based allocation efficiency, where Γε ∈ [0, 1]. ε > 0
is a parameter of inefficiency aversion. L > 0 means that scarce resources
have been misallocated to the satisfied although there still are dissatisfied
needs. The index reaches its minimum if L = Ω, that is, not a single unit
of the good is used for the satisfaction of needs. It reaches its maximum
if L = 0, that is, if there is no oversupply. If ε = 0, inefficiency does not
matter, that is, Γ0 = 1. If 0 < ε < 1 (ε = 1, ε > 1), we have increasing
(constant, decreasing) inefficiency aversion. A graphical illustration of the
gamma function is given in Figure 1 with Ω = 100 (and D 6= ∅).
Finally, we define an index of need-based justice.
Definition 4 (Index of Need-based justice) An index of need-based jus-
tice is a mapping J : (~ω, ν) 7→ R.
4 Axioms
A compelling index of need-based justice should satisfy several ‘technical’
and ethical axioms. Note that some of the axioms stated here (Monotonicity,
Sensitivity, Transfer) have first been introduced by Sen (1976) for poverty
measurement. First, we normalize J onto the [0, 1] interval:
Axiom 1 (Normalization, N) J(~ω, ν) ∈ [0, 1], where J = 1 (J = 0) in
the case of maximum (minimum) need-based justice.
It appears quite natural to assume that maximum need-based justice prevails
if nobody is left dissatisfied in her needs, D = ∅. The case of minimum
need-based justice is less straightforward because the dissatisfaction of needs
may have two distinct sources, namely, a lack of goods of services and/or
inefficiency of the allocation.
Second, we require J to be scale invariant:
Axiom 2 (Scale Invariance, SI) Let ~ω′ = λ · ~ω = (λ ·ω1, λ ·ω2, . . . , λ ·ωn)
and ν ′ = λν, then J(~ω, ν) = J(~ω′, ν ′).
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Figure 1: Graph of the Gamma Function for Ω = 100
Scale invariance immunizes J to changes of the unit in which goods and
services are measured. It implies homogeneity of degree zero in endowments
and needs of the J function.
Monotonicity means that whenever the endowment of a dissatisfied (sat-
isfied) individual increases, J should increase (decrease).
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity, M) ∂J(~ω,ν)
∂ωi
{
> 0∀ i ∈ D
< 0∀ i ∈ S .
Additionally, we think that need-based justice is raised more by increasing
the degree of need-satisfaction of a very dissatisfied individual than of a less
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dissatisfied individual. This precept requires sensitivity of J with respect to
the degree of need-satisfaction.
Axiom 4 (Sensitivity, S) ∂J(~ω,ν)
∂ωi
> ∂J(~ω,ν)
∂ωj
∀ i 6= j, i, j ∈ D if γi < γj.
Next, we turn to the question how a progressive transfer, that is, a trans-
fer of resources δ > 0 from a less dissatisfied individual (donor) to a more
dissatisfied individual (recipient) changes J . It is assumed that the donor
remains at least as need satisfied as the recipient.
Axiom 5 (Transfer, T) For two allocations ~ω and ~ω′ with γk = γ′k ∀ k ∈
I−{i,j}, γi < γ′i = ωi+δν ≤ γ′j = ωj−δν ≤ γj, δ > 0, we have J(~ω, ν) < J(~ω′, ν).
Finally, we propose that J is the weighted sum of average individual
need-satisfaction multiplied with the need-based efficiency of the allocation.
Axiom 6 (Need-Principle, NP) J(~ω, ν) = Γε
n
∑
i∈I αiγi.
The parameter αi = α(γi) is the weight that is given to individual i, where
αi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I and αi > 0 for at least one i ∈ I. A = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} denotes
a weighting scheme. Efficiency in terms of Γε is an inherent property of the
need-principle.
5 Indices
The following propositions contain our main results.
Proposition 1 (Incidence of Need-satisfaction (INS)) Let AINS = {αi =
0 : i ∈ D;αi = 1 : i ∈ S} and ε > 0, then
JINS,ε =
Γε
n
s . (2)
satisfies NP, N, and SI. It does not satisfy M and S. T is satisfied only if the
donor belongs to the set of satisfied individuals before and after the transfer.
Proof. NP: The need principle is fulfilled by the construction of JINS,ε. Just
replace αi by 0 for γi < 1 and by 1 for γi = 1.
N: If ωi ≥ ν ∀ i ∈ I then s = n, Γε = 1 and, hence, JINS,ε = 1. If
ωi < ν ∀ i ∈ I then s = 0 and, hence, JINS,ε = 0. Moreover, if L = Ω and
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D 6= ∅ then Γε = 0 and, hence, JINS,ε = 0.
SI:
J ′INS,ε =
(
1−
∑
i∈S λωi−λν∑
i∈I λωi
)ε
n
s
=
(
1−
∑
i∈S ωi−ν∑
i∈I ωi
)ε
n
s
= JINS,ε .
M:
∂JINS,ε
∂ωi
= 0∀ i ∈ D contradicts M.
S: See M.
T: Without loss of generality, we can set n = 3, where i = {1 .= recipient, 2 .=
donor, 3
.
= neutral}. The endowment of the neutral individual is set to
ω3 = 0. We have to consider four cases. (i) Let 1, 2 ∈ D before and after
the transfer, then JINS,ε = J
′
INS,ε = 0, which contradicts T. (ii) Let 1 ∈ D
and 2 ∈ S before and 1, 2 ∈ D after the transfer, then JINS,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
3
>
J ′INS,ε = 0, which contradicts T. (iii) Let 1 ∈ D and 2 ∈ S before and after the
transfer, then JINS,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
3
< J ′INS,ε =
(
1−ω2−δ−ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
3
, which confirms T.
(iv) Let 1 ∈ D before the transfer, 1 ∈ S after the transfer, and 2 ∈ S before
and after the transfer, then JINS,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
3
is maximized for ω1 → ν from
below (the first derivative of JINS,ε w.r.t. ω1 is given by
1
3
(
ω1+ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
ε(ω2−ν)
(ω1+ω2)(ω1+ν)
> 0)
and J ′INS,ε =
(
1−ω1+ω2−2ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
3
· 2 is minimized for ω1 → ν from above (its first
derivative is given by −1
3
21+ε
(
ν
ω1+ω2
)ε
ε
ω1+ω2
< 0). Hence, setting ω1 = ν yields
JINS,ε =
(
1−ω2−ν
ν+ω2
)ε
3
< J ′INS,ε =
(
1−ω2−ν
ν+ω2
)ε
3
· 2, which confirms T. Obviously,
changing the total number of neutral individuals does not change the result
as long as I is a finite set. 
JINS,ε is a pure measure of the incidence of need satisfaction. It does not
react to changes in endowments of the dissatisfied (unless they become fully
need satisfied) and therefore does neither satisfy M nor S. Apart from the
two special cases addressed in the proof to proposition 1, it does not fulfill T
either. The maximization of JINS,ε could easily be obtained by redistributing
goods and services from those who are most dissatisfied in their needs to
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the least dissatisfied and therefore become satisfied in their needs such that
the number of satisfied individuals s increases. Accordingly, the incidence of
need satisfaction is of limited use as an ethical measure of need-based justice.
Proposition 2 (β-ε-Index) Let Aβ = {αi = γ−βi : i ∈ D, αi = 1 : i ∈ S},
0 < β < 1 and ε > 0, then
Jβ,ε =
Γε
n
(∑
i∈D
γ1−βi + s
)
(3)
satisfies NP, N, SI, M, and S. T is fulfilled if the recipient remains among
the dissatisfied. T is also fulfilled if the recipient becomes satisfied and the
positive satisfaction effect exceeds the negative efficiency effect.
Proof. NP: The need principle is fulfilled by the construction of Jβ,ε. Just
replace αi by γ
−β
i ∀ i ∈ D and by 1 ∀ i ∈ S.
N: If ωi ≥ ν ∀ i ∈ I then s = n, Γε = 1 and hence Jβ,ε = 1. If ωi = 0 ∀ i ∈ I
then γi = 0 and hence Jβ,ε = 0. Moreover, if L = Ω and D 6= ∅ then Γε = 0
and hence Jβ,ε = 0.
SI:
J ′β,ε =
(
1−
∑
i∈S λωi−λν∑
i∈I λωi
)ε
n
(∑
i∈D
(
λωi
λν
)1−β
+ s
)
=
(
1−
∑
i∈S ωi−ν∑
i∈I ωi
)ε
n
(∑
i∈D
(ωi
ν
)1−β
+ s
)
= Jβ,ε .
M: The first derivative of Jβ,ε with respect to ωi is given by
∂Jβ,ε
∂ωi
=

efficiency effect (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
ε
Γε−1
n
L
Ω2
(1− β)
(∑
j∈D
γ1−βj + s
)
+
satisfaction effect (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γε
n
(1− β)(γi)
−β
ν
> 0 ∀ i ∈ D
ε
Γε−1
n
L− Ω
Ω2
(1− β)
(∑
j∈D
γ1−βj + s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
efficiency effect (−)
< 0 ∀ i ∈ S .
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S: Consider two individuals i, j ∈ D, then ∂Jβ,ε
∂ωi
>
∂Jβ,ε
∂ωj
if and only if γi < γj,
which is due to the satisfaction effect.
T: Without loss of generality, we can set n = 3, where i = {1 .= recipient, 2 .=
donor, 3
.
= neutral}. The endowment of the neutral individual is set to
ω3 = 0. We have to consider four cases. (i) Let 1, 2 ∈ D before and after the
transfer, then Jβ,ε =
1
3
((
ω1
ν
)1−β
+
(
ω2
ν
)1−β)
< 1
3
((
ω1+δ
ν
)1−β
+
(
ω2−δ
ν
)1−β)
=
J ′β,ε due to positive net satisfaction effect. (ii) Let 1 ∈ D and 2 ∈ S be-
fore and 1, 2 ∈ D after the transfer, then Jβ,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)
3
((
ω1
ν
)1−β
+ 1
)
<
1
3
((
ω1+δ
ν
)1−β
+
(
ω2−δ
ν
)1−β)
= J ′β,ε, due to the positive efficiency effect and the
positive net satisfaction effect. (iii) Let 1 ∈ D and 2 ∈ S before and after the
transfer, then Jβ,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)
3
((
ω1
ν
)1−β
+ 1
)
<
(
1−ω2−δ−ν
ω1+ω2
)
3
((
ω1+δ
ν
)1−β
+ 1
)
=
J ′β,ε due to the positive efficiency effect and the positive satisfaction ef-
fect. (iv) Let 1 ∈ D before the transfer, 1 ∈ S after the transfer, and
2 ∈ S before and after the transfer, then Jβ,ε =
(
1− ω2−ν
ω1+ω2
)
3
((
ω1
ν
)1−β
+ 1
)
<(
1−ω1+ω2−2ν
ω1+ω2
)
3
· 2 = J ′β,ε only if the positive satisfaction effect exceeds the neg-
ative efficiency effect. 
With regard to the transfer axiom, we think that case (iv) represents
a sensible restriction. In terms of need-based justice it makes more sense
to transfer endowments to dissatisfied individuals until they become exactly
satisfied rather than diminishing need-based allocation efficiency by excessive
transfers.
There are two interesting limiting cases: For β = 0 we get
J0,ε =
Γε
n
(∑
i∈D
γi + s
)
(4)
which is the (efficiency weighted) average degree of individual need satisfac-
tion. J0,ε does not satisfy S and T , case (i). For β = 1 we get
J1,ε = Γε (5)
which is a pure index of need-based allocation efficiency. Obviously, it does
not satisfy M , S and T , case (i).
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6 Numerical Examples
We consider a group of n = 3 women – Anna, Berta and Carla – who need
a daily vitamin C dose of 100 mg each to stay healthy. Thus, their total
need is 300 mg/day. Table 1 gives numerical examples. The table lists
several vitamin C allocations, the respective degree of need satisfaction, the
need-based efficiency of the allocation in terms of Γ1, and the corresponding
need-based justice indices JINS, J0.5 and J0 (setting ε = 1).
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Allocation 1 endows the group with a total of 250 mg/day vitamin C.
Anne and Berta take 40 and 70 mg/day, respectively, and therefore are dis-
satisfied. Carla takes 140. Hence s = 1 and γCarla = 1. Carla’s oversupply
leads to a loss in need-based allocation efficiency such that Γ1 = 0.840. Com-
puting the incidence of need satisfaction yields JINS =
Γ1
n
× s = 0.280. The
average degree of need satisfaction (J0) is 0.588. We get J0.5 = 0.691 for the
β-ε-index, evaluated at β = 0.5.
Allocation 2 demonstrates the perverted impact that taking away 30
mg/day from Anne and passing it to Berta (who then becomes need-satisfied)
has on the incidence of need satisfaction. As compared to allocation 1,
JINS = 0.560 is doubled, that is, need-based justice increases.
Allocations 3 to 5 compare the impact of increasing Anne’s, Berta’s and
Carla’s vitamin C endowment by 20 mg/day. Since Ω is raised by 20 mg/day,
need-based allocation efficiency increases (decreases) according to M if Anne’s
or Berta’s (Carla’s) endowment is increased. Moreover, as compared to allo-
cation 1, J0 increases both for Anne and Berta, but it is not sensitive towards
their initial endowments. In contrast, as required by S, J0.5 is raised more
by Anna’s extra 20 mg than by Berta’s, because Anne has a lower initial en-
dowment. Due to the negative efficiency effect, additionally endowing Carla
with 20 mg decreases J0 and J0.5 as required by M.
The final four allocations demonstrate how progressive transfers affect
need-based justice. In allocation 6, Berta transfers 10 mg to Anne (case (i)).
J0.5 increases as compared to allocation 1 due to the positive net satisfaction
effect. Due to its linearity in need-satisfaction J0 remains constant. In allo-
cation 7 Carla transfers 41 mg to Anne (case (ii)). Carla therefore becomes
dissatisfied, but need-based justice increase as required by T. Allocation 8
simulates an transfer from Carla to Anne (cases (iii), which increases need-
based justice. Finally, allocation 9 involves an progressive transfer from Carla
to Berta such that Berta becomes exactly satified (case (iv) of T).
7 Conclusion
Need considerations are an important ingredient of empirically informed nor-
mative theories of distributive justice. The present paper introduces a con-
cept of need-based justice which is related to social participation in terms of
the capabilities approach and provides a measurement of need-based justice.
Borrowing from poverty measurement, we require an ethical measurement of
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need-based justice to satisfy several axioms such as monotonicity, sensitivity
and transfer. Need-based allocation efficiency becomes part of the measure-
ment through the need principle. The incidence of need-satisfaction in terms
of the efficiency-weighted head-count ratio of need-satisfied people does not
satisfy monotonicity and sensitivity, and it satisfies transfer for special cases
only. The β-ε-index satisfies all axioms. Transfer is fulfilled even if the recip-
ient becomes satisfied as long as the positive satisfaction effect exceeds the
negative efficiency effect.
Though we think that neediness is best characterized by social participa-
tion in welfare states and therefore is closely related to Sen’s (1983) concept
of absolute deprivation, other – more absolute or more relative – notions of
need are compatible with our formal approach to the measurement of need-
based justice. Of course, the catalogue of desirable properties for an index
of need-based justice could be altered or amended. Other functional forms
are conceivable. In so far, we see our contribution as a first step to a more
complete view of distributive justice that also includes need-based justice.
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